Reasoning is a crucial part of natural language argumentation. In order to comprehend an argument, one has to reconstruct and analyze its reasoning. As arguments are highly contextualized, most reasoning-related content is left implicit and usually presupposed. Thus, argument comprehension requires not only language understanding and logic skills, but it also heavily depends on common sense. In this article we define a new task, argument reasoning comprehension. Given a natural language argument with a reason and a claim, the goal is to choose the correct implicit reasoning from two options. The challenging factor is that both options are plausible and lexically very close while leading to contradicting claims. To provide an empirical common ground for the task, we propose a complex, yet scalable crowdsourcing process, and we create a new freely licensed dataset based on authentic arguments from news comments. While the resulting 2k high-quality instances are also suitable for other argumentation-related tasks, such as stance detection, argument component identification, and abstractive argument summarization, we focus on the argument reasoning comprehension task and experiment with several systems based on neural attention and language models. Our results clearly reveal that current methods lack the capability to solve the task.
Introduction
'Most house cats face enemies', 'Russia has the opposite objectives of the US', and 'there is much innovation in 3-d printing and it is sustainable'. What do these propositions have in common? They were never uttered but solely presupposed in arguments made by the participants in on-line comments.
Presuppositions are a fundamental pragmatic instrument of natural language argumentation in which a part of an argument is left unstated. This phenomenon is also referred to as common knowledge (Macagno and Walton 2014, p. 218) , enthymemes (Walton 2007b, p. 12) , implicit or tacit major premises (Amossy 2009, p. 319) , or implicit warrants (Newman and Marshall 1991, p. 8 ). Wilson and Sperber (2004) suggest that, when we comprehend an argument, we reconstruct the implicit warrants driven by the cognitive principle of relevance. In other words, we go straight for the interpretation that seems to be the most relevant and most logical within the given context (Hobbs et al. 1993) . Although any incomplete argument can be completed in a number of different ways (Plumer 2016) , it is assumed that certain common knowledge is shared between the arguing parties (Macagno and Walton 2014, p. 180) .
Filling the gap between claims and premises of natural language arguments empirically has remained an open issue, due to the inherent difficulty of re-constructing the worldknowledge and reasoning patterns of arguments. In a direct fashion, Boltužić andŠnajder (2016) let annotators write down implicit warrants but concluded only with a preliminary analysis due to a large variance in responses. In an indirect fashion, implicit premises correspond to major premises in argumentation schemes; a concept heavily referenced in argumentation theory. However, mapping the schemes to realworld arguments has turned out difficult even for the author himself (Walton 2012) .
Our main assumption is that, even though the length of the reasoning chain between claims and premises is not limited, it is possible to re-create a meaningful implicit warrant, only depending on what we take as granted and what needs to be explicit. As warrants embed our current presupposed world knowledge and connect the given reason with the given claim in an argument, we hypothesize that there are many other warrants that connect the given reason with different claims. In the extreme case, we argue that there exists an alternative warrant in which the given reason is connected to the very opposite claim. We approach this intuition practically by first 'twisting' the standpoint of an argument, trying to plausibly explain its reasoning, then twisting the standpoint back and use a similar reasoning chain to come up with an implicit warrant for the original argument. In other words, we investigate real-world arguments with a missing single piece of information that is taken for granted and considered as common knowledge, yet, would lead to the opposite standpoint if twisted (details follow when we discuss the dataset construction). We demonstrate the applicability of this process by performing a large crowdsourcing study resulting in 1,970 high-quality instances. On this basis, we then define a new task, called argument reasoning comprehension, which is demonstrated in the example in Figure 1 .
The main contributions of this paper are the newly proposed task and the construction of a dataset for this task. Alongside, there are further beneficial outcomes: (a) 2,884 user-generated arguments annotated for their stance towards a controversy, covering 50+ topics over six years, (b) 2,026 analyzed arguments with annotated reasons put forward to Title: Tax Break for Sports Info: Should pro sports leagues enjoy nonprofit status? Government is already struggling to pay for basic needs. And since ....., Sport leagues should not enjoy nonprofit government isn't required to pay for all the country's needs government is required to pay for the country's needs Figure 1 : Example instance of the argument reasoning comprehension task. support the stance, (c) 4,235 rephrased reason gists, useful for argumentative sentence compression and argument summarization, and (d) a method for checking the reliability of crowdworkers in document labeling and span annotations that uses traditional inter-annotator agreement measures.
Related work
A widely accepted view is that an argument consists of a Claim and one or more Premise(s) (reasons) (Damer 2013) . Toulmin (1958) elaborated on a model of argument in which the reason supports the claim on behalf of a warrant. The abstract structure of an argument then is Reason → (since) Warrant → (therefore) Claim. The warrant thus takes the role of an inference rule, similar to the major premise in Walton's terminology (Walton 2007a) . In principle, the chain Reason → Warrant → Claim is applicable to deductive arguments and syllogisms, which allows us to validate arguments properly formalized in propositional logic. However, most natural language arguments are in fact inductive (Govier 2010, p. 255) or defeasible (Walton 2007b, p. 29) . 1 Accordingly, the unsuitability of formal logic for natural language argumentation has been discussed by argumentation scholars since the 1950's (Toulmin 1958) . To be clear, we do not claim that arguments cannot be represented logically (e.g., in predicate logic), however the drift to informal logic in the 20th century makes a strong case that natural language argumentation is more than a modus ponens; see (van Eemeren et al. 2014) .
In argumentation theory research, the notion of a Warrant has also been contentious. Some argue that it is perfectly clear only in Toulmin's examples, whereas the distinction of warrants from premises fails in practice, i.e., it is hard to tell whether a given reason of an argument is a Premise or a Warrant (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger 1987, p. 205 ). However, Freeman (2011) provides alternative views on modeling an argument. Given a Claim and two or more Premises, the structure of the argument is linked if the reasoning step involves the logical combination of the Premises. If we treat a Warrant as a simple Premise, then the linked structure fits the intuition behind Toulmin's model, such that both Premise and Warrant combined give support to the Claim. For a deeper theoretical analysis, see (Freeman 2011, Chap. 4) . 1 A recent empirical example is provided by Walker, Vazirova, and Sanford (2014) who propose possible approaches to identify patterns of inference from premises to claims in vaccine court cases. The authors conclude that it is extremely rare that a reasoning is explicitly laid out in a deductively valid format.
What makes comprehending and analyzing arguments hard is that Claims and Warrants are usually implicit (Freeman 2011, p. 82) . As they are 'taken for granted' by the arguer, the reader has to infer the contextually most relevant content that she believes the arguer intended to use. To this end, the reader relies on common sense knowledge (Oswald 2016; Wilson and Sperber 2004) .
The challenge of reconstructing implicit premises has also been faced in computational approaches to natural language argumentation. When designing their argument diagramming tool, Reed and Rowe (2004) pointed out that the automatic reconstruction of implicit premises is a task which skilled analysts find both taxing and hard to explain. More recently, Feng and Hirst (2011) as well as Green (2014) outlined the reconstruction of missing enthymemes or warrants as future work, but they never approached it since. To date, the most advanced existing attempt in this regard is from Boltužić andŠnajder (2016) . The authors let annotators 'reconstruct' several propositions between premises and claims and investigated whether the number of propositions correlates with the semantic distance between the claim and the premise. They conclude, however, that the written warrants heavily vary both in depth and in content. By contrast, we investigate cases with a missing single piece of information that is considered as common knowledge, yet leads to the opposite conclusion if twisted. This makes our approach original. Recently, Becker et al. (2017) also experimented with reconstructing implicit knowledge in short German argumentative essays. In contrast to our work, they used expert annotators who iteratively converged to a single proposition.
As we propose a new task involving natural language comprehension, we also review the most relevant work outside argumentation here. In particular, the goal of the semantic inference task textual entailment is to classify whether a proposition entails or contradicts a hypothesis (Dagan et al. 2009 ). A very similar task, natural language inference, was boosted by releasing the large SNLI dataset (Bowman et al. 2015) containing 0.5M entailment pairs crowdsourced by describing pictures. Although the understanding of semantic inferences is a crucial part of language comprehension, argumentation also requires coping with phenomena beyond semantics. Mostafazadeh et al. (2016) introduced the cloze story test, in which the appropriate ending of a narrative has to automatically selected. The overall context of this is completely different to ours (coherent narratives vs. reasoning in argumentation). Moreover, the narratives were written from scratch by explicitly instructing crowd workers, whereas our data come from genuine argumentative comments.
In contrast to our genuine argumentative data source, few synthetic datasets for general natural language reasoning have been recently introduced, such as answering questions over a described physical world (Weston et al. 2016) or an evaluation set of 100 questions in the Winograd Schema Challenge (Levesque, Davis, and Morgenstern 2012) .
Finally, we note that, although being related, research on argument mining and stance classification is not in the immediate scope of this paper. For details on these, we therefor refer to recent surveys from Lippi and Torroni (2016) or Mohammad et al. (2016) .
The argument reasoning comprehension task
Let R be a reason for a claim C, both of which being propositions extracted from a natural language argument. Then there is a warrant W that justifies the use of R as support for C, but W is left implicit.
For example, in a discussion about whether declawing a cat should be illegal, an author takes the following position C (which is her implicit claim): 'It should be illegal to declaw your cat'. She gives the following reason R: 'They need to use their claws for defense and instinct'. 2 The warrant W could then be 'If cat needs claws for instincts, declawing would be against nature' or similar. W remains implicit, because R already implies C quite obviously. So, according to common sense, any further explanation seems superfluous. Now, the question is how to find the warrant W for a given reason R and claim C. Our key hypothesis in the definition of the argument reasoning comprehension task is the existence of an alternative warrant AW that justifies the use of R as support for the opposite ¬C of the claim C (regardless of the question of how strong this justification is).
For the example introduced above, assume that we 'twist' C to 'It should be legal to declaw your cat' (¬C) but use the same reason R. Is it possible to come up with an alternative warrant AW that justifies the reason? In the given case, 'most house cats don't face enemies' would bridge R to ¬C quite plausibly. If we now use a line of reasoning based on AW but twist AW again such that it leads to the original claim C, we get 'most house cats face enemies', which is a plausible warrant W for the original argument containing R and C. 3 Constructing an alternative warrant is not possible for all reason/claim pairs; in some reasons the arguer's position is deeply embedded. As a result, trying to give a plausible reasoning for the opposite claim ¬C either leads to nonsense or to a proposition that resembles a rebuttal rather than a warrant (Toulmin 1958) . However, if both W and AW are available, they usually capture the core of a reason's relevance and reveal the implicit presuppositions (examples are shown later in the paper).
Based on our key hypothesis (existence of AW ), we define the argument reasoning comprehension task as follows:
Given a reason R and a claim C along with the title and a short description of the debate they occur in, identify the correct warrant W from two candidates: the correct warrant W and incorrect alternative warrant AW . An instance of the task is thus basically given by a tuple (R, C, W, AW ). The debate title and description serve as the context of R and C. Being a binary task, we propose to evaluate argument reasoning comprehension using accuracy.
Dataset construction
In the following we describe the crowdsourcing process that we designed to construct authentic instances (R, C, W, AW ) of the argument reasoning comprehension task at large scale, as well as the dataset resulting from carrying out the process.
Source data
Instead of extending an existing dataset, we decided to create a new one from scratch for two reasons. First, we aimed for a variety of contemporary issues across topics in usergenerated web comments, and second, the resulting dataset were meant to be licensed under a permissive license.
As a source, we opted for the Room for Debate section of the New York Times. 4 It provides authentic argumentation on contemporary issues with good editorial work and moderation -as opposed to debate portals such as createdebate.com, for example, in which classrooms assignments, silly topics, and bad writing prevail. We manually selected 188 debates with polar questions in the title. These questions are controversial and provoking, giving a stimulus for stance-taking and argumentation. For each debate we created two explicit opposing claims (stances), e.g., 'It should be illegal to declaw your cat' and 'It should be legal to declaw your cat'. We crawled all comments to these debates and sampled about 11k high-ranked, root-level comments. 5
Crowdsourcing process
Our entire crowdsourcing process consists of the eight consecutive steps that are illustrated in Figure 2 and detailed below. The actual crowdsourcing was done on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform and took place from December 2016 to April 2017. We initiated the process with 5,000 randomly sampled comments. As a preprocessing step, each comment was split into elementary discourse units (EDU) using Sis-taNLP (Surdeanu, Hicks, and Valenzuela-Escarcega 2015) . 1. Stance annotation The task of the AMT workers in this step is to decide which stance a comment is taking (recall that we always have two explicit stances). Alternatively, they could classify a comment as considering both sides while remaining neutral or as taking no stance. With stance, we here resort to an argument's main claim and use these two terms interchangeably below (in related work, a claim of an argument holds a stance towards an issue). 6 All resulting 2,884 stance-taking comments in our dataset were also annotated as to whether being sarcastic or ironic; these phenomena pose challenges in analyzing argumentation and remain an open problem (Habernal and Gurevych 2017) .
Reason span annotation
For the stance-taking comments, the workers are next asked to select those spans that give a reason for the claim (with a single EDU as the minimal unit). In our dataset, 5,119 such reason spans were found, 
Reason disambiguation
We aim to study to what extent a reason itself implies a stance. While 'C because of R' gives room for many plausible interpretations (see our discussion on implicit warrants above), deciding R → C or R → ¬C depends on how much presupposition is embedded in R. In this step, the workers have to decide which is the most plausible claim (C or ¬C) seeing R. Also, they may choose both C and ¬C at the same time (in the given data, the respective reasons eventually turned out to be rather irrelevant). For our dataset, we used only those 1,955 instances in which reason R indeed implied C, since this suggest at least some implicit presuppositions in the reason. 5. Alternative warrant This step is the trickiest one, as it requires a large amount of creativity and brain twisting. As already exemplified at the beginning of this section, workers need to come up with a plausible explanation why R supports ¬C (the alternative warrant, AW ) or mark this as impossible. Exact instructions for the workers can be found in the provided sources. All 5,342 alternative warrants in our dataset are written under CC-0 license. 6. Alternative warrant validation As the previous step produces largely uncontrolled writings of fabricated alter-7 For example, consider this argument on longer school days: 'I know-with moral certainty-that so many people are underperformers (including me) when they don't get enough sleep.' It was simplified to 'Many people, including me, underperform without an adequate amount of sleep.' Similarly, the argument on taxing capital gains 'From a strict economic viewpoint, all income should be taxed equally. This would avoid the huge incentives -and wasted, non-productive investments -in gaming the system, that firms and investors routinely make.' was rewritten as 'Equality in taxed income would eliminate risky investment by firms and investors.' native warrants AW , we validate for each AW whether it actually relates to the given reason R. To this end, we show AW and ¬C to the workers providing two alternative reasons; R itself and a distracting reason. Besides, the workers also annotate how 'logical' the explanation of the alternative warrant is (0-2 scale). For our dataset, we sampled the reason from the same debate topic that is most dissimilar to R, using Skip-Thought Vectors (Kiros et al. 2015) and cosine similarity. Only those 3,791 instances where the workers correctly validated R were used for the further steps.
Warrant for original claim
This step refers to the second part of the example shown in the beginning. Given R and C, the workers have to make minimal modifications to the alternative warrant AW , such that it becomes an actual warrant W (i.e., so that R → W → C). For our dataet, we restricted this step to those 2,613 instances that had a 'logic score' of at least 0.68 (obtained from the annotations mentioned above), in order to filter out non-sense alternative warrants. All resulting 2,447 warrants were again written under CC0 license.
Warrant validation
To ensure that each resulting tuple (R, C, W, AW ) allows only one logical explanation (i.e., either R → W → C or R → AW → C is correct, the other one incorrect), all instances are validated by the workers. Disputing cases in our dataset were corrected by an expert to ensure quality. We ended up with 1,970 instances to be used for the argument reasoning comprehension task.
Agreement evaluation and statistics
In order to keep strict quality measures in the entire crowdsourcing process, we propose an evaluation method that enables the use of 'classic' inter-annotator agreement measures for crowdsourcing, such as Fleiss' κ or Krippendorff's α. Applying these measures directly to crowdsourced data has been disputed (Passonneau and Carpenter 2014) . For estimating gold labels from the crowd, several models have been proposed; we rely on MACE (Hovy et al. 2013) . Given a number of noisy workers, MACE outputs best estimates of gold labels, which outperforms simple majority votes. Usually, at least five workers are recommended for a crowdsourcing task, but how reliable is the output really?
We hence collected 18 assignments per item and split them Table 1 : Details and statistics of the dataset resulting from the crowdsourcing process we carried out. *Input instances were filtered by their 'logic score' assigned in Step 6, such that the weakest 30% were discarded. A more detailed description including details about filtered instances is available in the README file in the source code.
into two groups (9+9) based on their submission time. We then considered each group as an independent crowdsourcing experiment and estimated gold labels using MACE for each group, thus yielding two 'experts from the crowd.' Having two independent 'experts' from the crowd allowed us to compute standard agreement scores. We also varied the size of the sub-sample from each group from 1 to 9 by repeated random sampling of assignments. This revealed how the score varies with respect to the crowd size per 'expert'. Figure 3 shows the Cohen's κ agreement for stance annotation with respect to the crowd size computed by our method. As MACE also includes a threshold for keeping only the most confident predictions in order to benefit precision, we tuned this parameter, too. Deciding on the number of workers per task is a trade-off between the desired quality and the budget. For example, reason span annotation is a harder task; however, the results for six workers are comparable to those for the expert annotations in (Habernal and Gurevych 2017) . 8 Detailed statistics of the entire crowdsourcing process that we carried out for our dataset, including tasks for which we created data as a by-product, are listed in Table 1 . 8 A detailed figure is available in the supplementary material; not to be confused with Figure 3 which is related to stance annotation. Error bars = std. dev; only shown for two thresholds Figure 3 : Cohen's κ agreement for stance annotation on 98 comments. As a trade-off between reducing costs (i.e., discarding fewer instances) and increasing reliability, we chose 5 annotators and a threshold of 0.95 for this task, which resulted in κ = 0.58 (moderate to substantial agreement).
Examples
Below, we show three insightful examples in which implicit common-sense presuppositions were revealed during the process of constructing the alternative warrant AW and the original warrant W . For lack of space, we omit the debate title and description, but they should become clear from the context. A complete walk-through example can be found in the supplementary material.
R: Cooperating with Russia on terrorism ignores Russia's overall objectives. C: Russia cannot be a partner AW : Russia has the same objectives of the US W : Russia has the opposite objectives of the US R: Economic growth needs innovation. C: 3-D printing will change the world AW : there is no innovation in 3-d printing since it's unsustainable W : there is much innovation in 3-d printing and it is sustainable R: College students have the best chance of knowing history. C: College students' votes do matter in an election AW : knowing history doesn't mean that we will repeat it W : knowing history means that we won't repeat it
Experiments
Given the dataset, we performed first experiments to assess the complexity of the argument reasoning comprehension task. To this end, we split the 1,970 instances of the form (R, C, W, AW ) in our dataset into three sets based on the year of the debate they were taken from: years 2011 through 2015 became the training set (1,210 instances), 2016 the development set (316 instances), and 2017 the test set (444 instances). This split follows the paradigm of learning on the past data and predicting on new ones. In addition, much lexical and topical overlap is removed thereby.
Human upper bounds
In order to evaluate human upper bounds of the task, we sampled 100 random instances from the test set and distributed them among 173 survey participants (on AMT); each participant had to answer 10 questions (each corresponding to one instance). We also inquired about the participant's highest completed education (six categories) and about the amount of formal training she had in reasoning, logic, or argumentation (no training, some training, extensive training). In addition, we asked for each instance how familiar the participant was with the topic (3-point scale). How hard is the task for humans? It depends, as shown in Figure 4 . Whereas education has almost negligible influence on the performance, the more extensive formal training in reasoning the participants have, the higher their score is.
Overall, 30 participants out of 173 scored 100%. The average score for those with extensive formal training is 90.9%. For all participants, the average score was 79.8%. Does familiarity with the topic influence human performance? Not really. When computing the Spearman correlation between the average familiarity and score of a participant, we found no significant correlation in almost all education/training configurations. This finding suggests that argument reasoning comprehension skills are likely to be independent of topic-dependent factual knowledge. 
Computational models
To assess the complexity of computationally approaching argument reasoning comprehension, we carried out first experiments with systems based on the following models. The simplest model we considered is the random baseline, which chooses either of the candidate warrants of an instance by chance. As another baseline, we used a 4-gram Modified Kneser-Ney language model trained on 500M tokens (100k vocabulary) from the C4Corpus (Habernal, Zayed, and Gurevych 2016) . The effectiveness of language models was demonstrated by Rudinger et al. (2015) for the narrative cloze test where they achieved state-of-the-art results. We computed log-likelihood of the candidate warrants and picked the one with lower score. 9 To specifically appoach the given task, we implemented two neural models based on a bidirectional LSTM with attention. In the standard attention version, we encoded the reason and claim using a BiLSTM and provided it as an attention vector after max-pooling to LSTM layers from the two available warrants W 0 and W 1 (they correspond to W and AW , see below). The more elaborated version used intra-warrant attention, as shown in Figure 5 . Both versions were also extended with the debate title and description added as context to the attention layer (w/ context). We trained the resulting four models using the ADAM optimizer, with heavy dropout (0.9) and early stopping (5 epochs), tuned on the development set. Input embeddings were pre-trained word2vec's (Mikolov et al. 2013) . We ran each system three times with different random initializations.
To evaluate all systems, each instance in our dataset is represented as a tuple (R, C, W 0 , W 1 ) along with a label (0 or 1). If the label is 0, W 0 is the correct warrant, otherwise W 1 . Figure 5 : Intra-warrant attention. Only the attention vector for W 1 is shown; the attention vector for W 0 is constructed analogously. Gray boxes represent a modification with additional context.
Recall that we have two warrants W (referring to the original claim) and AW (the alternative warrant) whose correctness depends on the claim: W is correct for R and C, whereas AW would be correct for R and ¬C. We thus doubled the training data by adding a permuted instance (R, C, W 1 , W 0 ) with the respective correct label; this led to increased performance. The overall results of all approaches (humans and systems) are shown in Table 2 . Intra-warrant attention with rich context outperforms standard neural models with a simple attention, but it only slightly beats the language model.
A manual error analysis of 50 random wrong predictions (a single run of the best-performing system on the dev set) revealed no explicit pattern of encountered errors. Drawing any conclusions is hard given the diversity of included topics and the variety of reasoning patterns. A possible approach would be to categorize the warrants using, e.g., argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed, and Macagno 2008) and break down the errors accordingly. However, this is out of scope of the current paper and is thus left for future work.
Can we benefit from alternative warrants and opposing claims? Since the reasoning chain R → AW → ¬C is correct, too, we also tried adding respective instances to the training set (thus doubling the size). In this configuration, however, the neural models failed to learn anything better than a random guess. The reason behind is probably that the opposing claims are lexically very close, usually negated, and the models simply cannot pick this up.
Conclusions and outlook
We presented a new task called argument reasoning comprehension that tackles the core of reasoning in natural language argumentation -implicit warrants. To obtain data for the task, we designed a scalable crowdsourcing process with strict quality measures, and we proposed a strategy that adapts standard inter-annotator agreement metrics to crowdsourcing. Table 2 : Accuracy of each approach (humans and systems) on the development set and the test set respectively.
Following the process, we constructed a new dataset consisting of 1,970 task instances. The size of the data might not seem large (e.g., compared to 0.5M from SNLI), but tasks with hand-crafted data are of a similar size (e.g., 3,744 Story Cloze Test instances). Also, the crowdsourcing process is scalable and is limited only by the budget. 10 Moreover, we created several 'by-products' during the dataset construction that are valuable for argumentation research: 5,000 comments annotated with stance, which outnumbers the 4,163 tweets for stance detection of Mohammad et al. (2016) ); 2,026 arguments with 4,235 annotated reasons, which is six times larger than the 340 documents of Habernal and Gurevych (2017) ); and 4,235 summarized reason gists -we are not aware of any existing hand-crafted dataset for abstractive argument summarization built upon authentic arguments.
Based on the dataset, we evaluated human performance in argument reasoning comprehension. Our findings suggest that the task is harder for people without formal argumentation training while being solvable without knowing the topic. We also found that neural attention models outperform language models on the task.
In the short run, we plan to release the data for a shared task. 11 A deep qualitative analysis of the warrants from the theoretical perspective of reasoning patterns or argumentation schemes is also necessary. In the long run, an automatic generation and validation warrants can be understood as the ultimate goal in argument evaluation. But for the moment, we just made a first empirical step towards exploring how much common-sense reasoning is necessary in argumentation and how much common sense there might be at all.
